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New data show that between 1982 and 2007, in over 60 countries
governments were linked to and cooperated with informal armed
groups within their own borders. Given the prevalence of these
linkages, we ask how such links between governments and infor-
mal armed groups inﬂuence the risk of repression. We draw on
principal-agent arguments to explore how issues of monitoring and
control help understanding of the impact of militias on human
rights violations. We argue that such informal agents increase
accountability problems for the governments, which is likely to
worsen human rights conditions for two reasons. First, it is more
difﬁcult for governments to control and to train these militias, and
they may have private interests in the use of violence. Second, infor-
mal armed groups allow governments to shift responsibility and use
repression for strategic beneﬁts while evading accountability. Using
a global dataset from 1982 to 2007, we show that pro-government
militias increase the risk of repression and that the presence
of militias also affects the type of violations that we observe.
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In Darfur approximately 2 million people have been displaced and at least
180,000 have died, reportedly due to the actions of Sudanese government-
backed Janjaweed militia. In the Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo relied on the
violence of the Young Patriots to stay in power. In the former Yugoslavia
pro-government militias like the Red Berets or Arkan’s Tigers inﬂuenced
the character of the conﬂict. In Afghanistan, the coalition that defeated the
Taliban included Afghan militias, and the Awakening Groups were used
to counter the insurgency in Iraq. While the importance of these pro-
government armed groups is recognized in particular contexts, little is known
about their general impact on the respect for human rights.
How does the presence of certain actors affect the risk of physical harm
to civilians? Does the type of actor increase the risk of repression beyond
structural factors that are linked to a deterioration of human rights? Militias
are generally linked to state failure and violence (for example, Bates 2008;
Mason and Krane 1989; Reno 2002), and the case literature highlights the
extreme impact that these groups can have on human rights in speciﬁc coun-
tries (for example, Álvarez 2006; Campbell and Brenner 2002; Kirschke 2000).
From 1982 to 2007, governments in 61 countries had links to an informal
armed group within their own country (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013).
Given the prevalence of these groups, we seek to explain whether and
how they affect respect for human rights.1 It is plausible that the presence
of these informal armed groups raise control and accountability problems
that will contribute to higher levels of repression. We use the deﬁnition of a
pro-government militia (PGM) from Carey et al. (2013:250), who deﬁne it “as
a group that (1) is identiﬁed as pro-government or sponsored by the gov-
ernment (national or subnational), (2) is identiﬁed as not being part of the
regular security forces, (3) is armed, and (4) has some level of organization.”
These groups can be differentiated by their acknowledged proximity to the
state. Some groups have a recognized and semiofﬁcial link to the state, as
with village defense committees in India for example. With others the link is
looser and more informal, as with the pro-government militias in Darfur. The
nature of the group’s relationship to the government has theoretical impor-
tance. It affects the nature of the agency problem and has consequences
for the level of violence. We develop a theoretical argument that helps us
understand why these groups increase the risk of harm for civilians and
test it empirically using evidence from global data that span over 25 years.
1This study does not address the question of why and under what circumstances governments delegate
to informal armed groups. For a discussion on the beneﬁts and problems of delegating to informal armed
groups, see, for example, Ahram (2011a, 2011b), Campbell and Brenner (2002), Kalyvas (2008), Mazzei
(2009), Staniland (2012).
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 814 N. J. Mitchell et al.
Our argument modiﬁes and extends conventional principal-agent logic. The
principal-agent approach draws attention to how the principal controls a
self-interested agent in possession of superior information. The familiar con-
trol problems attributable to delegation are likely to be particularly severe
when governments use informal armed groups that operate outside the ofﬁ-
cial chain of command. Pro-government militias bring private interests to
the security task, which are more difﬁcult to monitor and check. The use
of these often ill-trained and poorly monitored groups is likely to produce
more opportunistic violence and contribute to higher levels of human rights
violations. In addition to these simple agency problems, governments may
take advantage of these informal armed groups in order to shift responsibility
for the violence they commit (Fiorina 1985; Mitchell 2004, 2012). Assuming
governments take advantage of the presence of these groups to shift respon-
sibility for violence, then human rights violations are likely to increase. But
not all rights are as easily violated by individual agents. The capability of
individual agents to commit violations varies, as does the beneﬁt the agent
may extract from the violation. We expect that “agent-centered” violations,
where the agent has the capacity to inﬂuence violations and where they
might bring some personal beneﬁt to the perpetrator, are most likely to be
affected by the presence of PGMs (Bohara, Mitchell, Nepal, and Raheem
2008; Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell 2007). We test these ideas empirically on a
global dataset for the years 1982 to 2007. The empirical results provide sup-
port for our theoretical arguments, highlighting the importance of the role of
agents in understanding why human rights are violated.
In the following section we build upon existing studies that link
militias with increased violence and the human rights literature that empha-
sizes the importance of accountability for protecting these rights. Based on
these insights, we develop the theoretical argument to explain why pro-
government militias are likely to increase the risk of human rights violations.
We seek to examine how human rights are affected when these groups
are present. While not our focus here, if these groups have important
human rights consequences, then empirical investigation of the incentives
for governments to use these groups has added signiﬁcance.
REPRESSION AND THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Existing research has linked the variation in repression to institutional, eco-
nomic, and demographic structures, to the level of threat posed by the
opposition, and, through democracy, to accountability and the likelihood
of withdrawal of public support (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Davenport
2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Gartner and Regan 1996; Landman
2005; Poe and Tate 1994). Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith, and Cherif
(2005:439) emphasize accountability in explaining the greater respect for
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 Pro-Government Militias and Human Rights 815
human rights shown by democracies: “accountability appears to be the criti-
cal feature that makes full-ﬂedged democracies respect human rights; limited
accountability generally retards improvements in human rights.” Cingranelli
and Filippov (2010) examine how accountability is “individualized” and how
electoral rules affect politicians’ incentives to monitor human rights protec-
tion. Conrad and Moore (2010) show that democratic institutions, which
demand accountability, decrease the likelihood of torture when the threat
from violent dissent disappears. While governments in democracies face
internal accountability mechanisms, less democratic regimes attract mon-
itoring and pressure from international institutions and NGOs (Kirschke
2000; Landman 2005;R i s s e ,R o p p ,a n dS i k k i n k1999; Simmons 2009).2 If
governments face the prospect of accountability internally and externally
from sanctions from the international community, they may choose to avoid
repression. DeMeritt (2014) suggests that principals are less likely to order
killings and agents are less likely to carry out these orders when international
actors intervene and might hold agents and principals to account for their
actions.
This insightful analysis directs attention to a decisive moment when
the international community can intervene to incentivize agents “to shirk
the order to kill” (DeMeritt 2014:9). The implication of this research is
that accountability leads governments to forego repression. Yet rather than
forego repression, an alternative for government ofﬁcials is to seek to evade
accountability for this violence. Evasion of accountability can take a vari-
ety of forms, including interference with monitoring activities of NGOs and
the media, the use of alternative types of repression, such as disappear-
ance or encounter killings, delegating repression to other states, as with
the policy of rendition, and to other actors, which is the focus of our study.
Governments have the opportunity to reduce accountability for human rights
violations when informal armed groups carry out security tasks. Questions of
how the agent inﬂuences the level and type of human rights violations have
received less attention (Ahram 2011a, 2011b; Lyall 2010), partly because of
the absence of cross-national data on agents.3
Case and comparative studies have linked militias with increased vio-
lence toward civilians. Clayton and Thomson (2014) show that the use of
militias by coalition forces in Iraq increase Iraqi civilian deaths. Focusing
on Arkan’s Tigers in Serbia and the Rwandan Interahamwe, Álvarez (2006)
stresses the importance of plausible deniability in explaining the use of
paramilitary groups in the context of genocide. Kirschke (2000) highlights the
2With “government” we refer to the executive.
3Research in sociology draws attention to this neglect on a conceptual and empirical level. Noting
that “most repression researchers have exclusively focused on the role of state authorities,” Earl
(2003:46) points to the role of private organizations, vigilantes, and countermovements in identifying
key dimensions of repression. Earl and Soule (2006) emphasize the role of agents and nonstate actors in
the analysis of repression.
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 816 N. J. Mitchell et al.
usefulness of these groups in implementing repression when countries are
pressured by the international community to democratize. Staniland (2012)
discusses the violent counterterror activities of former rebels operating on
the government side in Kashmir. Analyzing the development and demise
of mercenaries and pirates, Thomson (1994:42) argues that the authorizing
states are unable “to resist the temptation to allow or even authorize nonstate
violence while they denied responsibility and accountability for its conse-
quences.” She refers to the Nicaraguan contras and says “exploiting nonstate
violence remains a powerful temptation for state rulers” though “contempo-
rary state leaders must do this in secret” (Thomson 1994:152). Only a case
treatment and lengthy legal proceedings (for example, Milosevic ICTY) can
establish responsibility for the actions of even quite visible militia groups (for
example, Arkan’s Tigers) and whether it is a simple agency problem, a case
of can’t control, or a case of won’t control (Mitchell 2004). But systematic
analysis can show whether the presence of pro-government militias is linked
with an increase in repression beyond the factors that are generally associ-
ated with an increase in human rights violations in the quantitative literature.
In the following section, we extend the principal-agent model to explain
why PGMs are likely to increase the risk of harm to civilians.
AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE RISK OF REPRESSION
Delegation is advantageous to a principal who lacks the time or skill for
a task. In political science, the principal-agent model has been applied to
areas such as the relationship between elected ofﬁcials and the bureaucracy
(for example, Wood and Waterman 1991), to accountability in democ-
racies (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2006), to international organizations
(Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney 2006), to rebel recruitment (Gates
2002), humanitarian interventions (Kuperman 2008; Rauchhaus 2009), and
to the sponsoring of foreign rebel groups (Bapat 2012; Salehyan 2010). Our
focus is the implementation of repression (see also Cingranelli and Filippov
2010; DeMeritt 2014). Across these applications, the theory balances the con-
ventional beneﬁt of delegation, not having to do the task oneself, against the
difﬁculties and problems associated with the relationship between the prin-
cipal and the agents. Problems for the principal arise from the information
asymmetry and goal variance that characterize the relationship with the agent
(Miller 2005;M i t n i c k1980; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 2004). The agent
has private information not shared with the principal and possibly different
goals to those of the principal. Agents may shirk rather than work, or they
may secure some other private beneﬁt that was not part of the principal’s
intention (Brehm and Gates 1997). As Laffont and Martimort (2002:2) point
out, if there was no information asymmetry, “the principal could propose a
contract that perfectly controls the agent.”
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 Pro-Government Militias and Human Rights 817
We expect that agency problems pose a heightened risk for the security
and safety of citizens. The conventional responses to private goods-seeking
agents are selection, monitoring, and holding agents accountable (Banks
and Weingast 1992; Policzer 2004). To minimize costly monitoring, attention
is paid to screening agents, training, compensation, and to professional val-
ues (Arrow 1985;M o r r o w2007). With respect to militias, these mechanisms
are likely to be absent or implemented less carefully (Álvarez 2006:5) than
they are in the formal security sector. The informal organizations are likely to
recruit former rebels, strategic extremists, or those interested in private gain,
such as criminals, football hooligans (Arkan’s Tigers), or others with their
own motivations for committing violence. For example, the Janjaweed mili-
tia in Darfur is described as a “mix of bandits and camel herders” (Rice 2006).
The Chimeras in Haiti associated with President Aristide were recruited from
street gangs (Adams 2002). In Turkey, “the Turkish security apparatus devel-
oped a relationship with criminals, with ofﬁcial sanction. The criminals were
reportedly assigned to perform killings and to carry out other attacks or
what were seen as counterterrorist operations” (Kinzer 1996). Even assum-
ing that the leaders of these groups aim to inculcate a code of conduct, these
informal organizations are likely to be less equipped for that task than state
agencies. Members of informal armed groups are less likely to have internal-
ized systems of ethics, less likely to value their positions, and are less likely
to have Arrow’s “reputational enforcements” (Arrow 1985). In short, there
is both case evidence and a strong and widely accepted theoretical argu-
ment drawn from the analysis of delegation for the expectation that the use
of these groups will increase the likelihood of some types of human rights
violations.
Pro-government militia groups vary with respect to how formally they
are linked to the ofﬁcial security apparatus. While governments will deny
any links to some groups for as long as possible, such as in the case of
the Spanish Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group GAL in the 1980s, in other cases
this link is more formal and institutionalized, as with the Village Defence
Committees in India. While both types of militias are more likely than reg-
ular security forces to experience the agency problems outlined earlier,
armed groups that are separate from the regular security forces but have
formalized and ofﬁcial links to governments are better equipped to provide
“reputational enforcements” than informal militias. Opportunistic behavior
is more likely in informal groups. We expect that informal groups with no
formal or ofﬁcial link to the government will have greater recruitment and
operational discretion and less monitoring—and consequently a higher risk
of agency problems and therefore more substantially affect human rights
conditions.
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 818 N. J. Mitchell et al.
TURNING AGENCY PROBLEMS INTO AGENCY ADVANTAGES
The thrust of principal-agent logic is to identify the control problems con-
fronting principals. It suggests you cannot trust the agent. But this logic also
offers opportunities to unscrupulous principals as well as to agents. The
principal may knowingly recruit those with a reputation for violence (for
example, criminals) and then refuse to control these agents—rather than
actually lose control over them (Mitchell 2004; Poth and Selck 2009).4 There
may be circumstances when the principal derives a strategic beneﬁt from
what would appear to be the hidden actions of the agent, where the princi-
pal can exploit the distance to the agent. In his discussion of Schelling’s work
on nuclear deterrence, Miller discovers a policy area where an agent who has
opposing goals to the principal is a bargaining asset (Miller 2005; Schelling
1960). For nuclear deterrence, Schelling sees the beneﬁt of an agent (Curtis
“Boom-boom” LeMay) who, contrary to the principal (President Kennedy),
prefers “mutual annihilation to acquiescence” and who is “out of the prin-
cipal’s control” (Miller 2005:219). In other policy areas, political scientists
highlight the political, blame-shifting beneﬁts of delegation. Fiorina observed
a political incentive to delegate: “By charging an agency with implementation
( ...) legislators not only save themselves the time and trouble of making
speciﬁc decisions, they also avoid or at least disguise their responsibility
for the consequences of the decisions” (Fiorina 1985:187). Miller identiﬁes
this as a modiﬁcation of the traditional principal-agent model, in which
only the agent can exhibit moral hazard. Miller argues that under certain
circumstances the moral hazard argument can also apply to the principal.
Agencies can be created to provide the principal with the opportunity to
avoid responsibility, as was done in the United States in 1988 and 1990,
when Congress delegated authority to a base-closing commission in order
to avoid responsibility for this unpopular action (Miller 2005). The recogni-
tion of the political advantages of delegation is an important extension of
the principal-agent argument beyond its more conventional economic and
administrative implications of saving the principal time and trouble.
In the context of repression, the possibility to shift responsibility for
violent acts becomes particularly important. Governments perceive the use
of violence as a tool to stay in power and to ﬁght internal threats (for
example, Poe 2004). At the same time, governments that are seen to vio-
late basic human rights of their citizens may expect to be punished for
this by their domestic but also by the international community—for exam-
ple, in the form of naming and shaming, withheld foreign aid, reduced
4There is a “thin but complex” economics literature on informed principals (Laffont and Martimort
2002:360).
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 Pro-Government Militias and Human Rights 819
trade relationships, and exclusion from international organizations. Militias,
and in particular informal militias rather than semiofﬁcial militias, put “day-
light” (Fiorina 1985:187) between the government and the implementation of
the policy of repression. Beyond Fiorina’s shifting responsibility to another
agency, we argue that “legislators,” when they use militias to apply repres-
sion, have the opportunity to not only shift responsibility to another agency
but also onto the private interests or goals of the militia members, recog-
nizing that they might have personal motivations for committing violence,
and to claim a “runaway bureaucracy.” In this context, claims of informa-
tion asymmetry and goal variance become an asset rather than a problem,
as leaders can address threats with violence while shifting the blame to the
agents.5 Similarly, it is a move beyond Schelling’s President Kennedy and
the “runaway general” example. In this example, both principal and agent
were motivated by varying conceptions of strategic interest. Militias present
a moral hazard for the principal in offering privately motivated violence at
reduced risk and from which a principal may desire to derive strategic ben-
eﬁt. As a tool to evade accountability, militias provide a response to threats
a government perceives itself to be under, yet these informal armed groups
are not part of the state bureaucracy, and their strategically useful violence
is attributable to goal variance resulting from the militia members’ private
motives rather than to the government itself. We expect that the ability to
evade accountability as a result of a government collaborating with militias
increases the risk to civilians; governments are assumed to be more likely
to use a violent strategy if they expect to avoid being held responsible for
it. If challenged by other state or nonstate actors, they can claim a simple
agency problem and lack of control, passing the costs to the “out of control”
or “bad apple” agents. If this argument holds, we expect to ﬁnd higher levels
of violations where these groups operate.
The risk that militias pose to civilians is therefore not only due to simple
agency loss. Governments have the temptation to exploit the appearance
of information asymmetry: the problem of artiﬁcial information asymmetry
(Mitchell 2004). The agents follow private goals, such as violence for its
own sake or revenge, while the principal may use militias in pursuit of
strategic goals, such as obtaining information, eliminating opposition groups,
or precipitating population ﬂight (ethnic cleansing). In short, we expect that
the more “daylight” there is between the principal and the agent, the more
5Not all governments are aligned with militias because there are also risks to delegation. There is a risk
of exposure and the damage to reputation from associating with these groups, as well as the problem of
longer-term reliability of informal armed groups, including the prospect of betrayal. In the Philippines,
“Opponents of the vigilante groups [Alsa Masa] warn that they provide the makings of private armies for
a new generation of the warlords who have exercised local power in the Philippines” (Mydans 1987).
Because of the risks attached to surrendering the monopoly of violence, the provision of security has
been described as a “sovereign task” in the policy literature (Williamson 1999).
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 820 N. J. Mitchell et al.
difﬁcult the control problems will be and the more likely governments are
to shift responsibility to these groups.
The implication of our argument is that in addition to human rights
violations initiated by governments, and those individually initiated by out-
of-control agents, there are jointly initiated and jointly beneﬁcial violations
where the government refuses rather than loses control of the agent. The
risk of such additional violations is greater with informal militias where the
agent is more loosely connected to the principal. This modiﬁcation recog-
nizes that the goals of principal and agent may vary. The former may have
a strategic interest in violence and the latter a private enjoyment of violence.
But although these goals are different, they are not necessarily conﬂicting or
opposing, as the conventional principal-agent model suggests. In the area
of repression, the private interest of the agent in violating a prisoner’s or
civilian’s rights may coincide, not conﬂict, with the principal’s strategic inter-
ests, perhaps in extracting information or displacing unwanted populations
or even in motivating or rewarding the agents (Mitchell 2012).6 A govern-
ment will tolerate these informal armed groups as long as the violence they
commit is consistent with strategic goals and as long as the government
is not held accountable for them. Accountability is evaded by the militia’s
organizational separation from the regular security forces and the claim of
an agency problem.7 In short, where militias operate, there are likely to be
higher levels of human rights violations. This argument is summarized in the
following hypothesis:
H1: Informal pro-government militias decrease the respect for physical
integrity rights.
We expect that not all types of human rights violations are equally
affected by the presence of pro-government militias. As argued earlier, some
violations are more “agent-centered” than others. To be agent-centered, the
6There is some case evidence to support this argument that governments increase the use of violence
when they expect to evade accountability by using informal armed groups. Newly democratic Spain in the
1980s set up the armed group Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) that was not part of the regular
security forces and had no formal, legal, or ofﬁcial status. They were linked to 27 fatalities (Woodworth
2001:410). GAL’s activities were directed at ETA operatives, but it had also harmed French citizens. French
ministers demanded investigations, questioning Spanish EEC entry at the time (Woodworth 2001:178).
The Spanish Interior Minister denied responsibility: “Any insinuations linking the Spanish Government
to the attacks against leaders of the criminal gang ETA in the south of France are slanderous” (Acker
1984). In the Philippines in the 1980s, Alsa Masa, an anti-Communist vigilante group, was armed by the
military, endorsed by President Aquino, and supported by local governments. The appeal of Alsa Masa
was described as being able to “do the dirty work of counterinsurgency for a military that is ill-prepared
to launch effective operations” (Mydans 1987). A leader of the group was quoted as saying that “this
organization was useful to the military as a means of avoiding investigations of human rights abuses”
(The New York Times, April 4, 1987). In each of these cases, the delegation to informal armed groups in
order to escape responsibility led to serious forms of human rights violations.
7Oftentimes the link between militias and governments is not particularly well hidden. But “The point
is not to persuade audiences to agree with the account—that is, to support the action—but to make it
sound credible and reasonable” (Cohen 2001:62).
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 Pro-Government Militias and Human Rights 821
violation must be within an agent’s control and something from which an
agent might extract individualized beneﬁts. Torture or extrajudicial killing
may satisfy some immediate desire for revenge in a way that imprisonment
does not. Imprisonment may require the cooperation of other actors, such
as the courts or other ofﬁcial government agents. In contrast, torture may be
initiated by the agents themselves, by orders from principals, or by some
combination of the two. We expect that torture, killings, and disappear-
ances increase when informal militias are present. We expect that political
imprisonment is likely to be unaffected by informal militias.
H2: Informal pro-government militias decrease the likelihood of respect
for the physical integrity rights to be free from torture, killings, and
disappearances.
H3: Informal pro-government militias will not decrease the respect to be
free from political imprisonment.
OPERATIONALIZATION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Our key variable, Informal pro-government militias (PGMs), is coded 1 for
all country-years with at least one informal pro-government militia and 0 oth-
erwise. In cases where we do not have speciﬁc information on termination
dates, we code the last year in which PGM activities were reported as termi-
nation. Coding the time between the ﬁrst and last recorded year of activity
compared to coding PGMs as present for only those years for which we
have speciﬁc sources has the advantage of minimizing bias toward conﬁrm-
ing our theoretical argument as we include years of inactivity or unreported
PGM activity. Using this adjusted measure of PGMs is a tougher test for our
theory than correlating only country-years with documented PGM activities
with human rights. Fifteen percent of our observations are coded as hav-
ing informal pro-government militias. We also control for the presence of
semiofﬁcial PGMs, which have “a recognized legal or semiofﬁcial status, in
contrast to the loose afﬁliation of informal PGMs” (Carey et al. 2013:251).
Semiofﬁcial PGMs were present in 22% of observations. In comparison to
informal PGMs, we expect that semiofﬁcial PGMs are less likely to increase
the risk of agent-centered violations, because those groups are more closely
monitored by governments and provide fewer opportunities for plausible
deniability for violent acts they might commit.8
Operationalizing the Dependent Variable: Respect for Human Rights
To test our argument that informal PGMs increase the risk of violations, we
measure human rights with the 9-point cumulative Physical Integrity Rights
8Informal and semiofﬁcial PGMs are correlated with r = .29.
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(CIRI) Index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). This CIRI Index ranges from
0 (no respect for physical integrity rights) to 8 (full respect for these rights)
and is based on human rights reports by Amnesty International and US State
Department Country Reports. The advantage of the CIRI data is that they
allow us to disaggregate types of human rights violations and that these
data explicitly include violations by both the formal security sector and “pri-
vate groups” acting on the government’s behalf.9 Based on Hypothesis 1,
we expect that our variable Informal pro-government militia has a negative
impact on the CIRI Index.
Hypothesis 2 holds that informal PGMs have a particularly damaging
effect on human rights where violating those rights might bring personal
beneﬁts to their members beyond any expected strategic beneﬁts and where
the violation is within the agent’s individual capability to commit. To evaluate
this argument we divide the Physical Integrity Index into two human rights
measures. We differentiate violations that are more easily within the scope
of individual agents and that may yield some personal beneﬁt from those
violations that likely require the cooperation of other government agencies.
As agent-centered violations we identify torture, disappearances, and killings,
but exclude political imprisonment.10 By adding the individual CIRI scales
for torture, disappearances, and killings, each ranging from 0 (no respect
for these rights) to 2 (full respect for these rights), we create the variable
Agent-centered violations, which ranges from 0 (no respect for torture, dis-
appearances, and killings) to 6 (full respect of these three human rights).
We also use the CIRI variable Political imprisonment, which ranges from 0
(no respect of the right to be free from political imprisonment) to 2 (full
respect of this human rights). Based on Hypothesis 2, we expect that infor-
mal PGMs have a negative impact on Agent-centered violations. According
to Hypothesis 3, we expect PGMs to not have a signiﬁcant effect on Political
imprisonment because it is a less agent-centered violation.
Figure 1 shows the presence of informal pro-government militias at dif-
ferent levels of agent-centered violations, where higher values indicate a
higher respect for the right not to be tortured, killed, and disappeared. Each
bar indicates the percentage of observations with PGMs for each level of
agent-centered violations. The bar in the category “0” stands for no respect of
these rights, category “6” for full respect. Figure 1 points to a clear trend: the
lower the respect for human rights, the more common were pro-government
militias. For example, PGMs were present in 0.4% of cases that were coded
as having full respect of human rights (value 6 on the human rights mea-
sure), but in 70% of those cases that were coded as having no respect (value
0 on the agent-centered violations). This ﬁgure provides initial support for
9See CIRI coding manual, http://www.humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf (p. 7).
10Elsewhere we include sexual violence as an agent-centered violation (Butler et al. 2007). See also Cohen
and Nordås (2013) for an examination of sexual violence and militias in Africa.
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FIGURE 1 Informal pro-government militias and agent-centered violations, 1982–2007.
our theoretical arguments that pro-government militias are associated with a
higher risk of repression.
Control Variables
To test the impact of pro-government militias on human rights, we add
the PGM measure described earlier to a standard model of human rights
violations, which contains the following control variables: Armed conﬂict,
Democracy, Level of economic development, Population size,a n dLagged
repression (for example, Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Davenport and
Armstrong 2004; Landman 2005). With armed conﬂict governments face
large-scale and violent opposition, to which they often respond with vio-
lations of the right to physical integrity (for example, Davenport 2007;H a r f f
2003;K r a i n1997; Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999). We operationalize
Armed conﬂict with the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset, using the
25 battle-death threshold to identify such types of conﬂict (ACD; Gleditsch,
Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002). We expect Armed
conﬂict to have a negative impact on respect for human rights.
Controlling for armed conﬂict enables us to test the argument that PGMs
have an effect on repression independent of the impact of armed conﬂict.
One might argue that a link between repression and PGMs is spurious, due
to the impact of civil war on human rights. It is reasonable to assume that
PGMs are more common during civil wars, and civil wars are one of the
key determinants of repression. While 50% of observations with an armed
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FIGURE 2 Informal pro-government militias and democracy, 1982–2007.
conﬂict also have informal PGMs, 45% of observations with these groups
occur outside of armed conﬂict.
Our second control variable captures institutionalized democracies,
another key determinant of levels of human rights violations. The variable
Democracy is based on the Polity IV scale (Jaggers and Gurr 1995), where all
country-years with the value of 8 or higher are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). In Figure 2
we show how informal PGMs are distributed across different degrees of
democracy, using the Polity2 scale. For each level of the Polity2 scale, which
ranges from –10 (fully authoritarian) to +10 (fully democratic), we plot the
percentages of observations with informal PGMs. The graph shows that there
are no PGMs in the most autocratic regimes, and only six (0.8%) cases of
fully institutionalized democracy with informal militias.11 Such groups are
most commonly found in regimes with both democratic and autocratic char-
acteristics; 46% of observations at Polity2 = 0 are coded as having informal
PGMs. We control for economic development, which has been shown to
reduce the risk of repression (for example, Landman 2005;Z a n g e r2000),
and for population size, which is associated with an increase in violations
(for example, Henderson 1991). Economic development is measured with the
log of real GDP per capita and Population size with the log of population
11These cases represent GAL in Spain between 1982 and 1987.
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size, both from Penn World Tables. Based on past research we expect a pos-
itive coefﬁcient for GDP per capita and a negative coefﬁcient for population
size. Finally, we account for past human rights violations, as research has
shown that repression tends to continue (for example, Carey 2010; Poe et al.
1999).12
Research Design
With our empirical analysis we evaluate the effect of informal pro-
government militias on human rights violations beyond those factors that
are generally linked to higher levels of repression. Our analysis consists of
three steps: ﬁrst, we use ordered logit models with the standard errors clus-
tered on countries on our full sample. Model 1 evaluates the impact of PGMs
on human rights (H1), while Model 2 regresses PGMs on agent-centered
violations (H2), and in Model 3 on political imprisonment (H3). Given the
nonrandom assignment of PGMs, the results from this analysis might be inﬂu-
enced by selection effects and confounding variables. For example, countries
that are generally associated with poor human rights records (underdevel-
oped, nondemocratic countries with large populations and experiencing a
civil war) might also be the ones that are most likely to have pro-government
militias (for example, Bates 2008). In the second step, to separate the impact
of PGMs on human rights from other factors, we use coarsened exact match-
ing (CEM) to match observations with and without PGMs on our covariates
(Iacus, King, and Porro 2012). CEM minimizes the dependence on modeling
assumptions and selection bias (Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart 2007). In the ﬁnal
step, we use ordered logit analysis with the matching weights produced by
CEM to evaluate the impact of PGMs on human rights.
THE IMPACT OF PGMS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The results of our ordered logit analysis using the full sample are shown
in Table 1. In Model 1 the dependent variable is the 9-point CIRI Index of
physical integrity, in Model 2 it is agent-centered violations (torture, disap-
pearances, killings) on a 7-point scale, and in Model 3 political imprisonment
on a 3-point scale. The higher the value in these measures, the higher the
respect for the respective rights.
All control variables are highly statistically signiﬁcant as in earlier
research, apart from economic development in the model explaining political
imprisonment (Model 3). Informal PGMs have a highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant negative impact on the respect for physical integrity rights (Model 1),
supporting H1. As proposed in H2, these groups decrease the respect for
12Summary statistics are shown in the online appendix.
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TABLE 1 Ordered Logit Analysis of Human Rights, Full Sample
Model 1
CIRI Index
Model 2
Agent-Centered
Violations
Model 3
Political
Imprisonment
Informal PGMs −0.516∗∗∗ −0.563∗∗∗ −0.136
(0.109) (0.112) (0.148)
Semiofﬁcial PGMs −0.022 0.115 −0.355∗
(0.132) (0.133) (0.161)
Armed conﬂict −1.220∗∗∗ −1.228∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.150) (0.167)
Democracy 0.800∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 1.320∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.112) (0.148)
Economic developmenta 0.187∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.065
(0.049) (0.051) (0.056)
Population sizea −0.184∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.050)
Lagged DV 1.020∗∗∗ 1.258∗∗∗ 2.119∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.053) (0.089)
Cut-off point 1 −1.501∗∗ −0.828 −0.090
(0.506) (0.521) (0.583)
Cut-off point 2 0.020 0.877 2.525∗∗∗
(0.495) (0.509) (0.589)
Cut-off point 3 1.452∗∗ 2.485∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.522)
Cut-off point 4 2.761∗∗∗ 4.267∗∗∗
(0.505) (0.539)
Cut-off point 5 4.272∗∗∗ 5.947∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.551)
Cut-off point 6 5.701∗∗∗ 8.173∗∗∗
(0.517) (0.569)
Cut-off point 7 7.094∗∗∗
(0.521)
Cut-off point 8 8.940∗∗∗
(0.544)
Wald χ2 1,319.77∗∗∗ 1,198.08∗∗∗ 1,046.07∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.31 0.40
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −5,140.50 −4451.48 −2,303.42
Number of countries 155 155 155
Number of observations 3506 3507 3520
Note. Values are coefﬁcients with robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered on countries.
aVariable logged due to skewed distribution.
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001 (two-tailed).
freedom from torture, killing, and disappearance (Model 2). Finally, Model
3 supports H3, which argued that informal PGMs do not have a discernible
impact on political imprisonment. Comparing the impact of informal and
semiofﬁcial PGMs on human rights violations across these three models, we
can see that groups with a recognized link to governments do not increase
the violation of physical integrity rights in general or of agent-centered viola-
tions more speciﬁcally. However, these semiofﬁcial militias reduce the right
to be free from political imprisonment. The respective variable in Model 3 is
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statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05 with a negative coefﬁcient. This suggests
that for violations where at least some collaboration of ofﬁcial government
agents is required, such as the courts or prisons, the informal armed actors
have no discernible impact on the extent of these violations. Armed groups
that have a recognized status within the state but are outside of the regular
security apparatus do increase the risk of these types of violations.
We perform several robustness checks of these analyses. First, we
replace the binary indicator of PGMs with count variables for the number
of informal (ranging from 0 to 20 groups) and semiofﬁcial PGMs (ranging
from 0 to eight groups). While most results remain substantively the same,
among the militia variables only the number of informal PGMs has a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and negative impact on physical integrity. This suggests
that for the violation of agent-centered rights it is more important whether
there are any, or at least one, militia and not how many there are. Second, to
test whether characteristics related to the professionalization of the military
explains PGMs as well as human rights violations, we control for military
coup d’etats, using data from Powell and Thyne (2011), and logged mil-
itary personnel per capita, take from the COW data. The variable Coup
d’etat does not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on our human rights
measures in any of the three models. Military personnel per capita is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (p < .001) and negative only in Model 3 analyzing political
imprisonment. Again, the impact of militias and support for the central theo-
retical arguments remain substantively unchanged, noting that our measure
for semiofﬁcial PGMs drops below the p < .05 statistical signiﬁcance thresh-
old in the model of political imprisonment. Third, to test whether our results
might be driven by armed conﬂict cases, we restrict our sample to non-
conﬂict cases. The results remain substantively the same. Informal PGMs
continue to have a statistically signiﬁcant and negative impact on physical
integrity rights and agent-centered violations even outside of the context of
armed conﬂict. Fourth, we repeat Models 1–3 for democracies (with polity2
> 7) and nondemocracies separately. In the sample of democracies, we can-
not distinguish from zero the impact of informal PGMs on the three measures
of human rights, which could be because informal PGMs are present in only
8% of observations in this sample. For nondemocracies, the results resemble
the ones reported in Table 1.13
In the second step, we use coarsened exact matching (CEM), using
Informal PGMs as the treatment. The goal is to create two samples, one
with and one without the treatment, that are nearly identical on the covari-
ates in order to single out the effect of informal PGMs on human rights.
The matching substantially reduced the multivariate and the univariate dis-
tances between the control and treatment group in both matching exercises.
The two groups are virtually identical with respect to armed conﬂict and
13The results of all robustness checks are presented in the online appendix.
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TABLE 2 Ordered Logit Analysis of Human Rights with Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)
Model 4
CIRI Index
Model 5
Agent-Centered
Violations
Model 6
Political
Imprisonment
Informal PGMs −0.407∗∗ −0.526∗∗∗ −0.082
(0.140) (0.156) (0.169)
Semiofﬁcial PGMs −0.069 −0.039 −0.182
(0.270) (0.298) (0.276)
Armed conﬂict −0.732∗∗ −0.930∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.292) (0.266)
Democracy 1.332∗ 0.559 2.211∗∗
(0.533) (0.322) (0.743)
Economic developmenta 0.095 0.106 0.087
(0.102) (0.100) (0.152)
Population sizea −0.205∗∗ −0.185∗∗ −0.284∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.139)
Lagged DV 0.952∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 1.881∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.093) (0.155)
Cut-off point 1 −1.953∗ −1.679 −1.041
(0.936) (0.914) (1.546)
Cut-off point 2 −0.664 −0.312 1.417
(0.985) (0.937) (1.549)
Cut-off point 3 0.683 1.174
(0.964) (0.960)
Cut-off point 4 1.676 2.760∗∗
(1.000) (0.985)
Cut-off point 5 3.045∗∗ 4.692∗∗∗
(0.990) (1.003)
Cut-off point 6 4.563∗∗∗ 6.814∗∗∗
(1.011) (1.006)
Cut-off point 7 6.329∗∗∗
(1.081)
Cut-off point 8 8.037∗∗∗
(1.068)
Wald χ2 289.91∗∗∗ 283.99∗∗∗ 210.63∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.24 0.28
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −2,744.20 −2,417.22 −1,265.14
Number of countries 102 102 102
Number of observations 1768 1770 1776
Note. Values are coefﬁcients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countries.
aVariable logged due to skewed distribution.
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001 (two-tailed).
democracy, the two most consistently important covariates with human rights
violations, while some small differences with respect to economic develop-
ment and population size remains.14 In our ﬁnal step, we include the weights
that have been produced by CEM in the ordered logit analysis. The results
a r er e p o r t e di nTable 2.
14The online appendix contains multivariate and univariate measures of imbalance between the treatment
and the control group in the unmatched and matched samples.
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The sample size and number of countries are substantially reduced due
to the matching. All models are statistically signiﬁcant with a pseudo R2 of
0.23 or higher and with highly statistically signiﬁcant Wald χ2 statistic. Most
control variables show the expected impact. Armed conﬂict is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant in all three models, reducing the respect of all the type
of human rights tested in these analyses. Democracy is statistically signiﬁcant
in Models 4 and 6, increasing the respect for physical integrity rights and
freedom from political imprisonment. For agent-centered violations in Model
5, the democracy variable just fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance at p <
.05 but is also positive as in the other models. Population size is consistently
statistically signiﬁcant and negative. As in earlier research, the respect for
human rights declines as population size increases. Economic development
fails to reach conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance in all models using
the matched sample. Finally, the lagged indicators for human rights show
that higher respect in the past leads to higher respect in the future.
The results presented in Table 2 using the matched sample support
our results obtained from the full sample shown in Table 1. Informal PGMs
have a statistically signiﬁcant and negative impact on physical integrity rights
and on agent-centered violations but have no discernable impact on the
right to be free from political imprisonment. Semiofﬁcial PGMs fail to reach
meaningful levels of statistical signiﬁcance in all three models. In Model 4,
exponentiating the coefﬁcient for Informal PGMs we arrive at the odds ratio
of 0.666, which indicates that the respect for physical integrity rights dete-
riorates by about 33% when militias are present. This ﬁnding is consistent
with our theoretical argument (H1). In Models 5 and 6 we test the impact
of informal PGMs on different types of human rights. As a further test for
our argument, Model 5 tests the impact of Informal PGMs on Agent-centered
violations. We expect that the respect for these agent-centered rights (tor-
ture, extrajudicial killings, and disappearance) is most likely to deteriorate in
the presence of these groups. Again, PGMs are highly statistically signiﬁcant
in this model and carry a negative coefﬁcient, supporting H2. With an odds
ratio of 0.591, the substantive impact of informal PGMs is even larger on
these agent-centered violations, with a decline of about 41%, than on physi-
cal integrity rights more generally. Pro-government militias almost halve the
respect for the right to freedom from torture, killings, and disappearances.
Calculating the predicted probabilities of no violations for a nondemocratic
country that respects these rights at t–1, with average population size and
GDP, and no armed conﬂict, we ﬁnd that a country without informal PGMs
has a probability of 0.24 (95% conﬁdence interval ranging from 0.15 and
0.33) of not experiencing any of these human violations. This probability
declines to 0.16 (95% conﬁdence interval ranging from 0.08 and 0.23) for a
country with informal PGMs.
Model 6 uses Political imprisonment as dependent variable. We expect
that informal PGMs do not affect the respect for this human right, as the
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agents are less able to imprison opponents without cooperation from the
formal state apparatus. Informal PGMs fail to reach conventional levels of
statistical signiﬁcance, lending support to H3.15
DISCUSSION
Accountability is central to our understanding of human rights violations.
Earlier research links democratic accountability to lower levels of violations.
In this study we shift the focus to how the possibility to evade account-
ability, both on the part of the individual agent and on the part of the
government, affects the respect for human rights. Using the analysis of del-
egation, we draw out the implications of particular agents for the respect
for human rights. We argue that once governments cooperate with informal
armed groups, respect for human rights will suffer. Both goal variance and
information asymmetry, the central features of the agency problem, are likely
to be more accentuated with armed groups that are outside of the formal
chain of command. Recruitment, training, codes of conduct, and monitoring
standards are likely to be lower than in the formal security sector. In addition
to the temptation of hidden action for individual agents and simple control
problems leading to abuse and killing, principals have the temptation to
opportunistically use agents that are, or appear to be, difﬁcult to control in
order to evade accountability to state and nonstate actors and international
organizations. The presence of these groups permits governments to shift
responsibility for the consequences of the use of violence. Our argument
that where these groups are present, levels of human rights violations are
likely to be higher, is supported by the empirical analysis. This research con-
tributes theoretically with a modiﬁcation of standard principal-agent theory
and empirically with incorporating the organization of the security sector
and government militias into the explanation of human rights violations.
Including relevant agents in addition to structural features such as democ-
racy, levels of conﬂict, or economic conditions, is an important step forward
in understanding the nature of and variation in human rights violations.
Further research on the creation of these groups will provide additional
observable implications for the theoretical argument. While the focus of this
analysis has been the consequences of these groups for the protection of
15We exclude the lagged dependent variables to avoid including posttreatment variables in the matching
(Stuart 2010); this also produces a better match than with the lagged dependent variables. Including them
in the matching does not substantially alter the results. We have run the analyses using semiofﬁcial PGMs
as the treatment. The results remain substantively the same, although Semiofﬁcial PGMs just fail to reach
statistical signiﬁcance at p < .05 when explaining the respect for freedom from political imprisonment.
Including the military characteristics in the matching process leads to less-close matches, and almost
all variables lose their statistical signiﬁcance, although informal PGMs continue to have a statistically
signiﬁcant and negative impact on physical integrity rights. All results are shown in the online appendix.
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human rights, the causes of pro-government militias is an important research
puzzle in its own right. Evading accountability is not the only motivation for
choosing to delegate security tasks to these groups. For example, for gov-
ernments in particularly weak states, militias may be a low-cost and possibly
more reliable alternative to coup-prone regular forces.16 At the same time,
these states have limited capacity to exercise control over these irregular
forces. While our focus is on the domestic impact of militias, another useful
avenue for future research is to investigate how neighborhood and trans-
border factors inﬂuence the use and impact of these irregular groups (for
example, Bapat 2012).
We argue that the nature of violence as well as the extent of peace—in
terms of respect for human rights—is inﬂuenced by the organization of the
security sector. A parallel line of research examines the organization of forces
on the rebel side and its implications for violence (Cunningham, Bakke, and
Seymour 2012). Empirically, we tested the theoretical argument with a mea-
sure of whether the security sector included a militia. Our ﬁndings suggest
that the existence of informal pro-government militias does indeed put civil-
ians at greater risk of harm. This relationship is most pronounced for those
categories of violations that can be identiﬁed as more agent-centered viola-
tions. We show that when these groups are present, with or without armed
conﬂict, the likelihood of violations increases. Our focus on the choice and
contribution of the agents of repression shifts policy attention from factors
such as regime type and the economic environment to the organization of
violence. It highlights the responsibilities of governments in the choice of
its agents, as well as recruitment procedures, training, monitoring, and the
importance of the mechanisms familiar to the analysis of delegation. It raises
the issue of the monopoly of the use of violence and the implications for
the well-being of civilians. Attention to the choice of agent makes the pol-
icy problem one of policy and of governance rather than of less-tractable
sociological or economic transformations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Data and online appendix are available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/
internationalinteractions. Please direct all correspondence to the authors.
FUNDING
This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC), United Kingdom, RES-062-23-0363, and by the Centre for the Study
of Civil War (CSCW) at Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
16Thanks to reviewers for drawing our attention to this point and to coup-proclivity as a motivating factor.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
3
:
3
1
 
1
3
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
1
5
 832 N. J. Mitchell et al.
REFERENCES
Acker, Morgan. (1984) French Actions Step in Roundup of ETA Members. Globe and
Mail, January 13.
Adams, David. (2002) Haiti: How Nation-Building Has Gone Awry. St. Petersburg
Times, January 14.
Ahram, Ariel I. (2011a) Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ahram, Ariel I. (2011b) Origins and Persistence of State-Sponsored Militias: Path
Dependent Processes in Third World Military Development. Journal of Strategic
Studies 34(4):531–556.
Álvarez, Alex. (2006) Militias and Genocide. War Crimes, Genocide, & Crimes against
Humanity 2(1):1–33.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1985) The Economics of Agency. In Principals and Agents: The
Structure of Business, edited by J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeckhauser. Boston: Harvard
Business School Press.
Banks, Jeffrey, and Barry Weingast. (1992) The Political Control of Bureaucracies
under Asymmetric Information. American Journal of Political Science
36(2):509–524.
Bapat, Navin A. (2012) Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups. British
Journal of Political Science 42(1):1–29.
Bates, Robert H. (2008) Probing the Sources of Political Order. In Order, Conﬂict,
and Violence, edited by S. N. Kalyvas, I. Shapiro, and T. E. Masoud. Cambridge,
UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bohara, Alok K., Neil J. Mitchell, Mani Nepal, and Nejem Raheem. (2008). Human
Rights Violations, Corruption, and the Policy of Repression. The Policy Studies
Journal 36(1):1–18.
Brehm, John, and Scott Gates. (1997) Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic
Response to a Democratic Public. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith, and Feryal Marie
Cherif. (2005) Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human
Rights. International Studies Quarterly 49(3):439–457.
Butler, Christopher K., Tali Gluch, and Neil J. Mitchell. (2007) Security Forces
and Sexual Violence: A Cross-National Analysis of a Principal-Agent Argument.
Journal of Peace Research 44(6):669–687.
Campbell, Bruce B., and Arthur D. Brenner, eds. (2002) Death Squads in Global
Perspective: Murder with Deniability. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Carey, Sabine C. (2010) The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent.
Political Studies 58(1):167–186.
Carey, Sabine C., Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe. (2013) States, the Security Sector,
and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-Government Militias.
Journal of Peace Research 50(2): 249–245.
Cingranelli, David L., and Mikhail Filippov. (2010) Electoral Rules and Incentives to
Protect Human Rights. Journal of Politics 72(1):243–257.
Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. (1999) Respect for Human Rights after
the End of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research 36(5):511–534.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
3
:
3
1
 
1
3
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
1
5
 Pro-Government Militias and Human Rights 833
Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. (2010) The Cingranelli and Richards
(CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. Human Rights Quarterly 32(2):401–424.
Clayton, Govinca, and Andrew Thomson. (2014) The Enemy of My Enemy in My
Friend... The Dynamics of Self Defense Forces in Irregular War: The Case of the
Sons of Iraq. Studies in Conﬂict & Terrorism forthcoming.
Cohen, Stanley. (2001) States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering.
London: Polity Press.
Cohen, Dara K., and Ragnhild Nordås. (2013) Sexual Violence by Armed Actors:
Who Perpetrates, When and How? Patterns from the New SVAC Dataset,
1989–2009. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 29–September 1.
Conrad, Courtenay Ryals, and Will H. Moore. (2010) What Stops the Torture?
American Journal of Political Science 54(2):459–476.
Cunningham Gallagher, Kathleen, Kristin M. Bakke, and Lee J. M. Seymour. (2012)
Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation
in Self-Determination Disputes. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 56(1):67–93.
Davenport, Christian. (2007) State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davenport, Christian, and David A. Armstrong II. (2004) Democracy and the
Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996. American
Journal of Political Science 48(3):538–554.
Demeritt, Jacqueline H. R. (2014) Delegating Death: Military Intervention
and Government Killing. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution. doi:10.1177/
0022002713515406
Earl, Jennifer. (2003) Tanks, Tear Gas and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement
Repression. Sociological Theory 21(1):44–68.
Earl, Jennifer, and Sarah A. Soule. (2006) Seeing Blue: A Police-Centered Explanation
of Protest Policing. Mobilization 11(2):145–164.
Fiorina, Morris P. (1985) Group Concentration and Delegation of Legislative
Authority. In Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences,e d i t e db yR .G .N o l l .
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gartner, Scott S., and Patrick M. Regan. (1996) Threat and Repression: The Non-
Linear Relationship Between Government and Opposition Violence. Journal of
Peace Research 33(3):273–287.
Gates, Scott. (2002) Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion.
Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 46(1):111–130.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and
Håvard Strand. (2002) Armed Conﬂict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. Journal of
Peace Research 39(5):615–637.
Harff, Barbara. (2003) No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of
Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1995. American Political Science
Review 97(1):57–73.
Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney,
eds. (2006) Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.N e wY o r k :
Cambridge University Press.
Henderson, Conway W. (1991) Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression.
Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 35(1):120–142.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
3
:
3
1
 
1
3
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
1
5
 834 N. J. Mitchell et al.
Ho, Daniel, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Elizabeth Stuart. (2007) Matching as
Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric
Causal Inference. Political Analysis 15(3):199–236.
Iacus, Stefano M., Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. (2012) Causal Inference without
Balance Checking: Coarsened Exact Matching. Political Analysis 20(1):1–24.
Jaggers, Keith, and Ted R. Gurr. (1995) Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with Polity
III Data. Journal of Peace Research 32(4):469–482.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2008) Ethnic Defection in Civil War. Comparative Political Studies
41:1043–1068.
Kinzer, Stephen. (1996). In Turkey, New Accusations of Links Between Police,
Politicians and Criminals. The New York Times, December 31.
Kirschke, Linda. (2000) Informal Repression, Zero-Sum Politics and Late Third Wave
Transitions. Journal of Modern African Studies 38(3):383–405.
Krain, Matthew. (1997) State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of
Genocides and Politicides. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 41(3):331–360.
Kuperman, Alan J. (2008) The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons
from the Balkans. International Studies Quarterly 52(1):49–80.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort. (2002) The Theory of Incentives: The
Principal-Agent Model. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Landman, Todd. (2005) Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study. Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press.
Lyall, Jason. (2010) Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from
the Second Chechen War. American Political Science Review 104(1):1–20.
Mason, T. David, and Dale A. Krane. (1989) The Political Economy of Death Squads:
Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror. International Studies
Quarterly 33(2):175–198.
Mazzei, Julie. (2009) Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces: How Paramilitary Groups
Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina.
Miller, Gary J. (2005) The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models. Annual
Review of Political Science 8:203–225.
Mitchell, Neil J. (2004) Agents of Atrocity: Leaders, Followers and Human Rights
Violations in Civil Wars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mitchell, Neil J. (2012) Democracy’s Blameless Leaders: From Dresden to Abu Ghraib,
How Leaders Evade Accountability for Abuse, Atrocity and Killing.N e wY o r k :
New York University Press.
Mitnick, Barry M. (1980) The Political Economy of Regulation. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Morrow, James D. (2007) When Do States Follow the Laws of War? American
Political Science Review 101(3):559–572.
Mydans, Seth. (1987) Right-Wing Vigilantes Spreading in Philippines. The New York
Times, April 4.
Poe, Steven C. (2004) The Decision to Repress: An Integrative Theoretical Approach
to the Research on Human Rights and Repression. In Understanding Human
Rights Violations: New Systematic Studies, edited by S. C. Carey and S. C. Poe.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
3
:
3
1
 
1
3
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
1
5
 Pro-Government Militias and Human Rights 835
Poe, Steven C., and C. Neal Tate. (1994) Repression of Human Rights to Personal
Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. American Political Science Review
88(4):853–872.
Poe, Steven C., C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. (1999) Repression of the Human
Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the
Years 1976–1993. International Studies Quarterly 43(2):291–313.
Policzer, Pablo. (2004) How Organizations Shape Human Rights Violations. In
Understanding Human Rights Violations,e d i t e db yS .C .C a r e ya n dS .C .P o e .
Aldershot: Ashgate.
Poth, Stephan, and Torsten J. Selck. (2009) Principal Agent Theory and Artiﬁcial
Information. Politics 29(2):137–144.
Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne. (2011) Global Instances of Coups from
1950 to 2010: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 48(2):249–259.
Rauchhaus, Robert W. (2009) Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian
Intervention: Moral Hazards, Adverse Selection, and the Commitment Dilemma.
International Studies Quarterly 53(4):871–884.
Reno, William. (2002) The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States. Development
and Change 33(5):837–858.
Rice, Xan. (2006) Terror Link of Village Spared by Janjaweed. Observer, May 21.
Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. (1999) The Power of Human
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Salehyan, Idean. (2010) The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. Journal of
Conﬂict Resolution 54(3):493–515.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960) The Strategy of Conﬂict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Simmons, Beth A. (2009) Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in
Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Staniland, Paul. (2012) Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic
Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution
56(1):16–40.
Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. (2006) Delegation
and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Stuart, Elizabeth A. (2010) Matching Methods for Causal Inference: A Review and a
Look Forward. Statistical Science 25(1):1–21.
Thomson, Janice. (1994) Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State-Building
and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Waterman, Richard W., Amelia A. Rouse, and Robert Lee Wright, eds. (2004)
Bureaucrats, Politics, and the Environment. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1999) Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction
Cost Economics Perspective. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizations
15(1):306–342.
Wood, B. Dan, and Richard W. Waterman. (1991) The Dynamics of Political Control
of the Bureaucracy. American Political Science Review 85(3):801–828.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
3
:
3
1
 
1
3
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
1
5
 836 N. J. Mitchell et al.
Woodworth, Paddy. (2001) Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish
Democracy. New Haven: Yale Nota Bene.
Zanger, Sabine C. (2000) The Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime
Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977–93. Journal of Peace Research
37(2):213–233.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
3
:
3
1
 
1
3
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
2
0
1
5
 